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Scientific Conclusions Need Not Be Accurate, Justified, 
or Believed by their Authors* 
 




We argue that the main results of scientific papers may appropriately be published even if they 
are false, unjustified, and not believed to be true or justified by their author. To defend this claim 
we draw upon the literature studying the norms of assertion, and consider how they would apply 
if one attempted to hold claims made in scientific papers to their strictures, as assertions and 
discovery claims in scientific papers seem naturally analogous. We first use a case study of 
William H. Bragg’s early 20th century work in physics to demonstrate that successful science 
has in fact violated these norms. We then argue that features of the social epistemic 
arrangement of science which are necessary for its long run success require that we do not hold 
claims of scientific results to their standards. We end by making a suggestion about the norms 
that it would be appropriate to hold scientific claims to, along with an explanation of why the 
social epistemology of science—considered as an instance of collective inquiry—would require 









We hope that by inquiring together we may eventually discover the truth. Or, failing that, at least 
to achieve some other epistemic aim—we shall assume it is truth from here on out, though 
nothing turns on that choice of aim in particular. Whatever it may be, to achieve our long run 
epistemic goals, individuals or small teams must periodically make local contributions. The field 
of biology, say, has succeeded in its aim if it discovers the truth about biological systems, but 
what does this entail for how we evaluate individual papers published in biology journals? 
Should we say each of those must discover the truth about its particular topic matter? In 
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general, if we are to make progress in collective inquiry, what do we require from the individual 
contributors? 
 
Even if we grant that the relationship between our expectations for the whole process 
and our expectations for individual inputs must be complex (see Mayo-Wilson et al 2011), we 
evidently hold such individual contributions to some standards. The process of peer review as it 
now exists (on which see Heesen & Bright 2020) seems to presuppose that there are conditions 
under which it would be inappropriate to bring a conclusion to the collective attention of one’s 
field. Likewise, the very fact that many consider widespread replication failure (see e.g. Open 
Science Collaboration 2015) to be problematic suggests that they hoped for more from the 
principal claims of those fields in which that debate is happening. So what exactly are those 
norms which, in the good case, a particular local piece of scientific inquiry will satisfy in putting a 
conclusion forward? 
 
To answer this question, we turn for inspiration to a branch of analytic epistemology and 
philosophy of language that concerns itself with the conditions under which particular claims are 
properly put forward. We will understand “properly put forward” here to mean uttered in a way 
that coheres with the contextually appropriate utterance norms. It is often claimed that 
assertions are utterances held to certain norms, called norms of assertion. This does not mean 
that in our assertions we always (or even usually) meet the appropriate norms. But rather that 
assertions qua assertions are improper if they fail to satisfy the requirements set by these 
norms—indeed in some cases it is felt that it is constitutive of something being an assertion that 
it is held to these norms. 
 
In this paper, as a way into the general question of how individual pieces of inquiry may 
contribute to a successful joint endeavour, we explore whether the utterances made by 
scientists when announcing their findings and results are held to any of these clusters of norms 
of assertion. The analogy between assertions and discovery claims in scientific papers seems 
natural—intuitively, they are both ways of putting forward a claim about how the world actually 
is. So as a starting place for inquiry, it seems a good place to begin in thinking about what sort 
of norms one should satisfy in putting a claim forward. Take, for instance, a discovery claim 
drawn from the abstract from (at time of writing) a paper in the latest issue of the journal Cell. 
The authors claim that their results “demonstrate'' that “loss of Cx3cr1 in CNS-myeloid triggers a 
Cxcl10-mediated vicious cycle, cultivating a br-met-promoting, immune-suppressive niche” 
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(Guldner et al 2020). On its face, to claim to have demonstrated something is to claim that it has 
been shown to be true and what is being claimed true constitutes an assertion about how the 
immune system in the brain operates. However, we will find that such claims made about 
individual scientific contributions ought not be held to typical norms of assertion. We do not take 
a stand on whether the scientific conclusions should be held to be assertions or not, but we do 
claim that reflection upon why they are not held to typical norms of assertion is illuminating as to 
the general character of collective inquiry and the relationship its individual subcomponents 
must bear to the overall endeavour. 
 
There are three clusters of norms in the norms of assertion literature. The first cluster of 
norms studied by analytic epistemologists are the factive norms. Most famously there is the 
knowledge norm, owed to Timothy Williamson. According to this norm "[o]ne must: assert p only 
if one knows p" (Williamson 2000: 243). In a similar vein Manuel García-Carpintero (2004) 
proposes the norm that one must assert p only if one's audience comes thereby to be in a 
position to know that p (156).  Matthew Weiner, on the other hand, (2005), proposed a truth 
norm: assert only what is true. Jason Stanley has raised the suggestion that one may assert 
that p only if one knows that p (or is in a position to know that p) on the basis of evidence that 
gives one the highest degree of justification for one's belief that p. (2008: 35). John MacFarlane 
(2014: 108) proposes a norm that one ought to retract an (unretracted) assertion if it turns out 
not to be true. This first class of proposals is united in holding assertions improper if they are not 
true. 
 
The second cluster are justification norms. For instance, Jennifer Lackey, reflecting on 
what she calls "self-less assertions" in which one properly asserts what one does not believe, 
proposes that assertions are held to the norm "that it is reasonable to believe that p, and that 
the speaker asserts that p for this reason (even if in fact not believing that p)" (quotes from 
Pagin 2016, summarising Lackey 2007). Mikkel Gerken (2015), reflecting specifically on lab 
mates or collaborating scientists discussing ongoing research, advocates (in that context) a 
norm wherein scientists must be “discursively justified”—justified in their claims, and able to 
explain that justification to any who request reasons. Jonathan Kvanvig (2009: 145; 2011: 249–
50) has proposed that the norm of assertion is that one needs to be justified if one asserts, and 
that the relevant concept of justification is such that it is sufficient for knowledge, provided the 
proposition is both believed and true (and the justification is undefeated). 
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The third cluster are belief norms. Taking a cue from Grice (1961), Kent Bach (2008) 
argues that the only relevant rule on assertion is belief: “In the case of assertion, to be sincere is 
to hold the belief one expresses. So we can say that belief, not knowledge, is the rule on 
assertion” (77). Others have argued that it is only proper to assert what one believes justifiedly. 
Igor Douven (2006) defends the view that one should only assert what one believes to be 
rationally credible.  
 
We ground our inquiry in an exploration of whether norms of any of these types should 
be applied to scientific claims, and if not, why not. The aim of this paper is not to entirely dismiss 
the proposed norms of assertion as they are currently studied by analytic epistemologists. 
Rather, our aim is to demonstrate that these norms of assertion are not appropriate for 
important classes of scientific claims. In the next section we will say more about the sorts of 
claims we wish to study, and give a simple abstract example of such claims being made. We 
then argue that the points illustrated in this abstract case can also be studied in a more detailed 
historical case, and that we can generalise our lessons to modern scientific practice. We will 
give two different theoretical arguments for this: an argument from division of cognitive labour 
and an argument from the pessimistic meta-induction. 
 
 
Public Avowals in Science 
 
To be more precise about the target of this paper, we will call the class of utterances that we are 
interested in “public avowals.” These are utterances made by scientists aimed at informing the 
wider scientific community of some results obtained: conclusions in papers in peer-reviewed 
journals, conference presentations, posters, online pre-prints, etc. Indeed, these are the kind of 
utterances which we most commonly associate with the scientific community. Open up an issue 
of Science, for example, and one may read that “early vertebrate clades, both jawed and 
jawless, originated in restricted, shallow intertidal-subtidal environments” (Sallan et al. 2018). 
Public avowals may also be much more speculative, hesitant, or demure, such as this highly 
qualified statement appearing in the abstract of a recent paper in the American Journal of 
Sociology: “[a]pparent changes in disparities across census tracts may result partly from a 
higher level of sampling variation and bias due to the smaller sample” (Logan et al. 2018).  
 
We do not mean by public avowals, therefore, definitive statements about the world that 
are confidently maintained. Instead, we simply mean claims that scientists feel in a position to 
5 
put forward as a conclusion of their research. The conclusion claims of scientific papers are 
sometimes put forward in a qualified or hedged manner, but they are still statements that 
publicly report the results of research. Thinking about the norms or standards these public 
avowals are or ought to be held to is informative in telling us how to think about the central 
contributions of novel scientific papers. 
 
Mikkel Gerken (2015b) has argued that testimony between collaborating scientists 
during the process of collaboration are held to special epistemic norms. He argues that such 
intra-scientific testimony ought to be held to the standard of discursive justification. The kinds of 
utterances we are concerned with differ from Gerken. We are interested in the norms that 
govern inter-scientific testimony: claims made by scientists or collaborations aimed at the wider 
scientific community. These types of claims are meant to convey the products of scientific 
inquiry, rather than made during the course of that inquiry, and are made in public venues 
where the primary audience is other scientists. The paradigmatic cases of inter-scientific 
testimony are scientific articles published in specialist journals aimed at other expert scientists 
(for norms concerning co-authoring scientific papers see Huebner et al. 2017 and Bright et al. 
2018). This is because our focus is on the question of how individual contributions are made to 
a larger project of scientific inquiry; it is hence the relationship between an individual scientist 
and her broader scientific discipline that most concerns us. 
 
Public avowals in science should not be confused with extra-scientific testimony or 
“public scientific testimony.” Statements from scientists aimed at policy-makers are not the type 
of utterances we are interested in. It is important to distinguish between claims aimed at the 
scientific community and claims aimed at the general public or policy-makers. The IPCC 
assessment report on climate change, for example, while made publicly, is primarily aimed at 
political bodies, and such testimony is properly held to a different standard. Extra-scientific 
testimony is hence not the target of our paper. 
 
It is very important that we recognize that “public scientific avowals” are held to different 
epistemic norms than that of “public scientific testimony.” Confusing “public scientific avowals” 
and “public scientific testimony” can lead to disastrous misunderstandings about science 
communication. To anticipate some results of our argument, if a layperson were to only follow 
the specialist journals, the layperson may come to the conclusion that scientists often report 
false things, after reading many contradictory avowals made at the conclusion of competing 
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cutting-edge research papers. However, it would be a mistake for the layperson to think that 
when scientists make reports to policy-makers that these reports also have the same epistemic 
status as papers in scientific journals written for a primarily specialist audience. 
 
We will now argue that public scientific avowals should not be held to factive norms, 
justification norms, and belief norms. That is to say, we will argue that public avowals which 
violate all such norms are entirely appropriate in scientific inquiry. Our argument depends on 
how scientific findings are actually communicated in the scientific community, or the role such 
communications play. To illustrate the role of public scientific avowals in science, consider this 
scenario which a scientist may often find herself in: 
 
“Zahra is a scientist working at the cutting edge of her field. Based on her 
research, she comes up with a new hypothesis. She diligently pursues inquiry 
according to the best practices of her field for many months. Her new hypothesis 
would be considered an important breakthrough discovery. Zahra knows that 
many more studies will have to be done in the future in order to confirm her 
hypothesis. Further, she has read the current literature and realizes that the 
existing research in her field does not, on net, support her hypothesis. She does 
not believe that she has conclusively proven the new hypothesis. Nonetheless, 
Zahra sends a paper reporting her hypothesis to the leading journal in her 
subdiscipline. In the abstract of the paper, the conclusion, and talks she gives on 
her work, she advocates for her hypothesis. Peer reviewers, while also sceptical 
of the new hypothesis, believed that her research had been carried out according 
to best known practices and her paper would be a valuable contribution to the 
field. Her paper, which purports to have advanced a new hypothesis, is published 
and widely read by members of her community. In subsequent years, additional 
research in her field conclusively demonstrates that Zahra’s hypothesis was 
false.” 
 
Public scientific avowals like Zahra’s maintaining her hypothesis do not live up to the standards 
set by the norms of assertion. Zahra’s avowals were false. Her avowals were not justified by the 
total evidence available to her, since she is acquainted with the existing research in her field 
which does not support her hypothesis. Furthermore, Zahra herself did not fully believe in her 
avowals. Nonetheless, we believe that some such avowals that fail norms we hold assertions to 
can still be important to the epistemic success of science. In fact, Zahra’s conduct is exactly 
how scientists ought to act in order to successfully communicate scientific findings. During 
active scientific research, public scientific avowals will often fail to meet the norms of assertion, 
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yet scientists still need to continue to make avowals which report their findings to other 
members of their community. 
 
How widespread and generalizable are public scientific avowals that fail to meet the 
norms of assertion? Next, we present a short case study from the history of physics, which 
further illustrates how public avowals actually function among scientists. Scientists do 
sometimes report false, unknown and unjustified things that they do not believe, and this is an 
acceptable part of the scientific process. 
 
 
Case Study: Scientific avowals during periods of active inquiry 
 
In the early twentieth century, physicists were discovering a variety of new physical phenomena 
which were known as radioactivity. There was intense research into the true nature of the 
mysterious products that were emitted from cathode ray tubes: were they particles or waves? Of 
the cathode ray products, X-rays and γ rays were particularly perplexing. It was immediately 
discovered that X-rays reacted with photographic plates, suggesting that they were a form of 
light, which would hence suggest they are wave phenomena. However, they also reacted with 
other materials like particles. On the other hand, γ rays emissions were almost always 
accompanied with α and β particles. It was an open question whether γ rays and X-rays were 
material—that is, made up of particles—or whether they were waves in the electromagnetic 
aether. Investigations into the perplexing properties of all these forms of radioactivity were a 
major research program in the early twentieth century. Many different theories were proposed to 
account for the conflicting experimental data. 
 
An early researcher in radioactivity, William Henry Bragg proposed a neutral material 
particle theory of γ and X-rays, which he defended in a series of scientific articles from 1907-
1912 (Bragg 1907, 1908a, 1908b, 1908c, 1910, 1911, 1912). According to this material theory, γ 
and X-rays were in fact made up of positively charged α-particle and a negatively charged β-
particle bound together, making a neutral pair. Bragg argued that the leading theory at the time, 
the aether pulse theory (a form of wave theory), could not fully explain his experimental results 
regarding γ and X-rays. An aether pulse was thought of like a disturbance or ripple in the 
electromagnetic aether. Bragg published a paper in 1907 in the leading physics journal of the 
day, first criticizing the available evidence of both γ and X-rays as being an aether pulse, and 
also advancing his own material theory of neutral pairs: 
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“It appears, therefore, that all the known properties of the γ rays are satisfied on 
the hypothesis that they consist of neutral pairs.” (Bragg 1907, 441) 
 
“To sum up, it is clear that a stream of X rays contains some æther pulses, but it 
is not easy to explain all the properties of X rays on the æther-pulse theory. The 
explanations are easier if the rays are supposed to consist mainly of neutral 
pairs; and the existence of such pairs is not improbable a priori.” (Bragg 1907, 
448). 
 
Bragg made clear public avowals to the effect that both γ and X-rays had been shown to be 
material, such as in a 1908 letter to Nature: 
 
“Meanwhile, I will point out that the experimental proof of the material nature of 
the γ rays carries with it, almost surely, a corresponding proof as regards the X-
rays.” (Bragg 1908a, 270) 
 
But when pressed on the virtues of the competing aether pulse theory by fellow physicists, 
Bragg follows up in another 1908 letter to Nature: 
 
“If I admit the existence of ether pulse, I do not thereby weaken my contention 
that the most important and effective part of γ and X ray radiation is material." 
(Bragg 1908b, 560) 
 
In these series of articles and letters to Nature (see also Bragg 1908c), Bragg is putting forward 
to the scientific community his theory that both γ and X rays are material particles. His avowals 
here are not definitive, as Bragg often presents his hypothesis as a conditional or qualifies his 
statements with hedges like “almost surely.” Nonetheless, over the course of several years, 
Bragg published extensively defending his hypothesis against alternatives, pointing out virtues 
of his view over others, and was clearly putting forward his hypothesis as the conclusion to be 
drawn from his experiments on γ and X rays. 
 
Bragg’s public avowal of the neutral material particle theory did not satisfy the norms 
associated with assertion. First, the neutral material particle theory was false. γ and X rays are 
not material particles. γ and X rays are not made of neutral pairs, consisting of negatively and 
positively charged particles bound together. Even in 1907, Bragg theory was viewed as being 
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implausible by scientists in the physics community (Wheaton 1983, 94). A few years later, in 
1912, a decisive experiment was conducted by diffracting X-rays through crystals that settled 
the matter altogether. X-rays cannot be made up of material particles if they can be diffracted; 
X-rays must be waves. Today, physicists believe that both γ and X-rays are forms of light, 
composed of photons that exhibit wave-particle duality. There is no aether. 
 
Furthermore, Bragg’s public avowals were not justified on the total evidence, on balance, 
available at the time. In his early 1907 paper Bragg knew full well that his theory went against 
the available evidence at the time. Previous scattering experiments from Charles Barkla in 1905 
have been taken as corroborating evidence for the pulse theory. He knew he was opposing a 
"widely accepted" and "ably advocated" theory of γ and X-rays as aether pulses (Wheaton 
1981, 1983). According to Bruce Wheaton, one of the leading historians on this historical 
episode, the total evidence, on balance, was not on Bragg’s side: 
 
“While Bragg had been developing his novel hypothesis, Barkla's experiments 
had turned up new and remarkably homogeneous secondary x-rays. In its fully 
interpreted form, this evidence would prove to be virtually unanswerable by 
Bragg.” (Wheaton 1983: 90) 
 
Bragg was well acquainted with Barkla’s criticisms and corresponded with him about his 
experimental results throughout this period—they in fact exchanged a long chain of public 
letters in Nature at this time. Barkla’s results on both scattering and secondary X-rays cannot be 
accounted for on Bragg’s theory. So Bragg’s avowals cannot be justified on the total evidence 
available to him. 
 
Finally, Bragg did not believe in his theory. This is more apparent in Bragg’s personal 
letters. In 1910, Bragg had been corresponding with Arnold Sommerfeld, a leading German 
physicist. While Bragg had continued to publicly defend his particle theory, in private, Bragg was 
more candid about how he considered his theory: 
 
“I am very far from being averse to a reconcilement of a corpuscular and a wave 
theory: I think that some day it must come… I have suggested the neutral pair 
form myself: but I do not wish to press this unduly or be dogmatic about it. It 
seems to me to be the best model to be devised at present, and I have no right to 
claim more.” (reproduced in Wheaton 1981: 272) 
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Here, Bragg appears to admit that he is only committed to the neutral pair theory as a 
“suggestion” or the “best model at present.” Dogmatic belief in the neutral pair theory was 
untenable because shortly after Bragg’s first proposal of the theory, the α-particle was ruled out 
as a possible candidate for the positive component of the neutral pair. Bragg had to defend the 
possibility of an unknown positive particle as well as the neutral pair itself. The neutral pair 
theory was difficult to defend in face of mounting evidence against material theories, which is 
why Bragg was so circumspect about his doxastic state in his private letters. 
 
While Bragg’s public avowals about the neutral pair theory of γ and X-rays were false, 
unjustified on total evidence, and were not believed, we want to maintain that these avowals did 
not violate the norms of inter-scientific communication. Bragg, after all, was awarded the Nobel 
Prize in 1915 for his work on X-ray crystallography, a new field born out of his early work on the 
nature of X-rays. Furthermore, Bragg’s X-ray publications were widely read and discussed by 
other physicists and spurred decades of important research around X-rays. Bragg’s biggest 
critic, Charles Barkla, would later win the Nobel Prize in 1917 also for his own work on X-rays 
scattering, which were in part driven by Bragg’s provocative writings. 
 
Let us summarise, then, what this historical episode demonstrates. In a series of 
scientific public avowals Bragg defended a theory, the neutral material particle hypothesis. His 
conduct over the course of this research was felt to be sufficiently meritorious that it did not 
interfere with him winning the highest honour a scientist may achieve—the false theory spurred 
valuable research into the diffraction patterns of X-rays. Throughout this period, however, many 
of the avowals he made were false; by the time the Nobel was awarded this was certainly 
known to the physics community. As Bragg himself admits the full weight of evidence was not 
clearly on his side, and for this reason he was throughout privately quite circumspect about the 
extent to which he even believed his claims about the neutral pair. His public avowals, therefore, 
were neither true, nor justified by the total evidence available, nor believed to be either true or 
justified by Bragg himself. In the coming sections we shall argue that far from being unusual or 
evidence of some epistemic defect, this is a proper state for scientific public avowals. 
 
 
Norms for Public Avowals 
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The proper social epistemic functioning of science requires that public avowals in science fail to 
satisfy the norms we surveyed at the beginning. We take it to be uncontroversial that if there will 
be sustained and organised inquiry, any collective inquiry of the sort that science in fact is, there 
must be successful communication of the latest results and ideas about them. We will assume 
that the norms governing utterances communicating those results and ideas must reflect and 
endorse this state of affairs. Any norm for making avowals which rendered it impermissible to 
put forward just those claims which constitute necessary features of collective inquiry would be 
misaligned with the purpose of the activity it is supposed to govern. The scientific community 
has developed norms, both explicit and implicit, which govern utterances that are appropriate for 
communicating scientific findings to other scientists. We shall argue that these do not look like 
any of the purported norms of assertion, and for good reason. 
 
First, note the role of the division of cognitive labour. It is well recognised in philosophy 
of science that such a division is an important strategy for collective inquiry (Kitcher 2003; 
Strevens 2006). Scientists invest time and resources on different approaches to a research 
domain.  For example, during early investigations into γ and X-ray behavior, different 
researchers used different techniques to study γ and X-ray behavior. This division of labor is 
often not explicitly planned; rather the limited resources, credit and incentive structures of 
science encourage scientists to pursue new avenues of research and use different 
methodologies (see Kummerfeld & Zollman 2015; Zollman 2018). 
 
This division of cognitive labor means that during periods of active inquiry, scientists will 
often be publishing discoveries which are seemingly in conflict with each other. This in fact 
occurred during the γ and X-ray episode. Bragg investigated the particle-wave problem using, 
what we call today, hard X-rays, which are higher in energy. Charles Barkla (Bragg’s leading 
critic and fellow Nobel laureate) investigated using, what we call today, soft X-rays, which are 
lower in energy. This is because Bragg and Barkla used slightly different techniques for 
producing X-rays, due to the limited availability of radioactive source materials. They also used 
different experimental techniques to look at X-ray behavior (see Wheaton 1983). This led them 
to come to radically different conclusions about the nature of X-rays. Bragg’s experiments 
seemed to show that hard X-rays behaved like particles, because he observed large transfers of 
energies which is indicative of a particle hitting others. Since γ rays are even higher in energy 
than X-rays, Bragg was able to observe particle-like behaviors. Barkla, on the other hand, 
observed his soft X-rays to behave more consistently like waves. 
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At most one of these models of X-rays could have been correct (as it turned out neither 
are correct), yet both scientists had to publicise their work if scientific progress were to be made. 
Public avowals which break factive norms are thus epistemically beneficial and ought to be 
encouraged. Without them we would have never found out eventually that how X-rays are 
produced changes the energy of the X-rays—this was a fact we only discovered because Bragg 
and Barkla came to different results due to how they were generating X-rays in their labs. 
 
Moving beyond the necessity of the division of labour, the case study can be placed in 
the context of a broader historical argument. This builds on the kind of observations that 
inspired the pessimistic meta-induction (which typically focused on physics) and Stanford’s 
(2006) problem of unconceived alternatives (which focused on the history of biology). This can 
be supplemented by recent work on replicability in psychology (Open Science Collaboration 
2015) and cancer research (Begley & Ellis 2012). Frequent false public avowals are a 
necessary part of scientific progress, especially in areas of active inquiry. While scientific 
realists have argued that the history of science is also full of epistemic successes (for example, 
see Fahrbach 2011, 2017), it is nevertheless the case that individual contributions to science in 
areas of active inquiry are prone to error and are continuously replaced by new errors. 
 
These historical arguments can be supplemented with theoretical arguments. All our 
inquiry inevitably takes place in a situation of scarce resources and competing demands on our 
attention. Where this is the case, we have theoretical reason to believe that scientists will not 
gather as much data as a disinterested epistemic planner would have them gather (Heesen 
2015, 2018). Further, some of our inquiry takes place in contexts where there are weak signals, 
sparse data, and considerable difficulty in running replications. When this is so, limitations to 
what is possible through statistical inference give us reason to suppose that most of our 
published findings will be false (Ioannidis 2005; Romero 2016). 
 
These facts together suggest we have not found a better way of communicating findings 
than one in which there are frequent false avowals. As the X-ray case shows, it is crucial for 
false theories to be put forward, so to encourage more research; Bragg’s neutral pair theory of 
X-ray was directly responsible for sparking interest in studying radioactivity among many other 
physicists. If we agree with versions of the pessimistic meta-induction wherein new scientific 
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theories tend to demonstrate pervasive reference failure in their previous iterations, it means 
that almost all scientific public avowals turn out to be false.  
 
What does the necessity of dividing labour, and the pessimistic conclusions about 
present and past science, tell us about our norms for scientific public avowals? We think they 
quickly rule out factive norms. For factive norms would judge inappropriate a great part of those 
avowals that are necessary for the progress of any collective inquiry which must divide labour 
and proceed by correcting errors. It is not just that we in fact often will say false things in the 
course of inquiry, but rather that inquiry could not proceed in a way that was even remotely 
successful if we did not do so. Given the ubiquity and necessity of such things to collective 
inquiry this renders factive norms simply inappropriate as a means of deciding what conclusions 
ought to be put forward from individual contributions to the wider project. The norms of inquiry 
should not rule out necessary parts of the process. 
 
In fact, we note, there have been many who have argued that factive norms would not 
even be appropriate for reporting the results of “completed science”, whatever that might be. 
Consideration of the nature of physical laws (Cartwright 1983), scientific models (Frigg & 
Nguyen 2016), or what it would be to achieve understanding through science (Elgin 2007, 
Dellsén 2017), have all led philosophers to conclude that the terminus of scientific inquiry need 
not be taken to be possession of true beliefs. Avoiding requiring adherence to factive norms in 
the midst of inquiry thus looks even more attractive when one considers that it may not even be 
the desired end state.  
 
With one more assumption we think the arguments just reviewed also rule out 
justification norms as appropriate for governing individual contributions to collective inquiry. Our 
additional assumption is that whatever notion of justification is at play here it meets the total 
evidence requirement (Good 1967). Our total evidence includes the information just provided 
about what kind of process science is. Not just how generally reliable our inquiry is, but also 
how reliable it is for hard problems in particular, and how reliable we are ourselves as individual 
or communal epistemic agents. For any one paper, the reasons one could produce in favour of 
its central claim could well be outweighed by these competing second-order considerations. 
Hence if one is to communicate the results of sustained inquiry on hard problems then one 
cannot limit one’s avowals to those a total-evidence respecting epistemic norm would permit. In 
the X-ray case, Bragg knew that the total evidence, on balance, did not support his corpuscular 
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theory, but he nonetheless published and defended it publicly. This was not condemned by his 
contemporaries, rather they took his theory seriously despite everyone being aware that there 
exists compelling research which did not support it. So the surveyed justification norms of 
assertion cannot govern scientific avowals if they are to foster and permit publishing surprising 
findings or results, and we believe would not appropriately do so for any collective inquiry into a 
difficult or obscure matter. 
 
Finally, one might think that none the less the belief norms may apply to public avowals. 
For all that has just been said, scientists may believe their claims to be true or justified, as long 
as scientists are ignorant of this history or these theoretical results. Or, perhaps, as long as they 
retain their faith in their own particular claims even while being aware that in general studies like 
theirs are not reliable. So long as scientists can maintain belief in themselves, we could require 
they only avow when they believe all they have said. Indeed, the International Committee of 
Medical Journal Editors might be requiring this when it says  “[a]ll members of the group named 
as authors... should have full confidence in the accuracy and integrity of the work of other group 
authors” (ICMJE 2013: 3). 
 
We think such a retreat to mere belief or second order belief would be a mistake. For 
one thing, there is a large and persuasive literature in the philosophy of science detailing 
situations wherein inquiry may proceed well without scientists believing their claims (e.g. 
Kapitan 1992, Dawes 2013, Cabrera 2018, Dellsén 2018, Palmira 2018, Fleisher 2019). But 
over and above this we do not think that bad faith can be required of people. Quite generally we 
do not think a good social system can require participants to be ignorant as to the nature of their 
activities and their history, or require that they reason irrationally upon being informed about 
these things. False ideology or absurd arrogance should not be a prerequisite for inquiry. In this 
context it means that we cannot require as a condition of successful public avowal in science 
that scientists may not learn the various historical or theoretical facts that would undermine their 
faith in their assertions. Scientists do not need to believe that they are epistemically special in 
order to successfully participate in science.  
 
If one agrees that bad faith cannot be mandatory then one can move from the above 
arguments to a rejection of both the justification norms and the belief norms. Scientists may well 
know of themselves that they are engaged in an activity which is not reliable for the kind of 
results they report. They thus may well not think their investigations are sufficient reason to 
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believe their conclusions, or would suffice for justification all things considered. Their total 
evidence (inclusive of second order evidence) could not justify this, and they form their 
credences appropriately. Hence they may not believe their results at all, or believe them to be 
justified, and yet still properly avow.  We ought not rule out as inapt these avowals of scientists 
who take the full measure of their epistemic situation. Hence building on the social epistemology 
of dividing cognitive labour, the pessimistic meta-induction and related theoretical results, we 
have been able to generalise our case study. This ruled out the factive, justification, and belief 
norms as the proper means of deciding what sort of conclusions are appropriately put forward 
as individual contributions to collective inquiry. 
 
In some sense, of course, one could avoid this by just making weaker claims. Rather 
than saying X causes Y, one could say that according to one’s data X causes Y. The weaker 
claim might well be true, or at least justified even in light of total evidence, and perhaps ought to 
be believed in any case. Certainly it is the case that many scientific result claims are made in a 
hedged way in something like this fashion. Of course, at present we do not think that scientists 
always obey this norm of making only such weaker statements. However, if one was a strong 
advocate of one of the norms surveyed one could insist that strictly speaking only such weaker 
avowals would be proper, and fault those scientists who do not live up to this. 
 
We note this possibility simply to note that it is a path we shall not explore here. We are 
concerned here with what should be expected of individual contributions to a broader inquiry, 
not really the exact forms they take. We are only making an analogy to the norms of assertion 
literature, not trying to weigh in on speech act theory. In the context of scientific research, we 
cannot only concern ourselves with events in a particular laboratory, or evidential relationships 
between particular data sets and a proposition. We also must put forward candidates for 
scientific communal uptake and potential targets for future inquiry. This goes all the more when 
one considers, as we have largely set aside, that one wishes ultimately to make use of scientific 
claims as the basis of public policy, where their external validity is what is of paramount 
importance (c.f. Cartwright 2012 §4). 
 
We do not doubt that it would be possible to reform scientific communication behaviour 
such that one sticks to scientific public avowals that are proper according to one of the surveyed 
norms by insisting on appropriate hedging. One could then just say explicitly (perhaps in so 
many words): “we also suggest such and such as a candidate for further investigation.” Or one 
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could understand it to be an implicature that if Lab 1 reports that its inquiry suggested that X 
causes Y, Lab 2 might profitably investigate whether its own inquiry would suggest as much 
also. But our concern is not really with the precise linguistic form such claims would take so 
much as the social uptake amongst scientists. However results are conveyed, scientists must 
decide what claims are worthy of further tests (Friedman 2020, Thorstad 2021). Our point is that 
it would be inappropriate for scientists to insist that (in the absence of fraud or mistake or 
misfortune) these pursuit worthy claims must be true, or justified, or believed to be as much by 
their proponents. Further, we shall briefly outline a proposal for an actual norm that could 
appropriately govern, and is perhaps governing, scientific avowals in the next section, based on 
an analysis of the social epistemology of science. If one understands what norms avowals must 
satisfy in the good case, one can better adjust one’s attitude to them, without needing scientists 
to change their manner of communication. 
 
 
Primacy of the Social 
 
The upshot of the above is that scientific public avowals can, and in some cases ought, be 
allowed to be proper even when they are false, not justified in light of our total evidence, and 
neither believed to be true nor justified. While we are most concerned to show that this is 
normatively appropriate, we think this both matches the actual practice and standards of 
science and facilitates the enterprise of collective inquiry perpetuating itself successfully. The 
rejected norms were picked as the basis of our inquiry since they had been found plausible or 
defensible as norms for assertion, which is at least a somewhat related activity of putting 
forward scientific public avowals. So why this discrepancy? In short, we think this is because the 
social enterprise of inquiry requires that we allow people to be more lax in certain contexts than 
we normally require of individuals offering testimony, and through a long process of cultural 
evolution the scientific community developed norms of avowal to accommodate that fact. 
 
It may seem surprising that the norms in science are less, rather than more, strict than 
everyday life. Intuitively science might seem to be a place where we operate under especially 
strict epistemic standards. And in a sense this is true, so long as one understands the "we" in a 
genuinely plural sense. That is to say, it is the group that must achieve high standards of rigour, 
and how individuals contribute to that may be somewhat indirect. For the group to achieve this 
goal we may well need the individuals who make up the group to be emboldened to take 
creative leaps and offer bold conjectures on matters that are complex, abstruse, and generally 
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difficult to gain any epistemic purchase on. In this way our study of the somewhat niche topic of 
norms for avowals connects up with classic themes in the philosophy of science (e.g. 
Feyerabend 1993; Popper 2014), wherein it is emphasised that for science as a whole to 
progress individual scientists may operate in a somewhat gung-ho or ad-hoc manner. 
 
We think that what is required here is some form of contextualist epistemic norm (see 
DeRose 2002 for a factive version of this purported norm). Context, provided by the history and 
present consensus in a field, specifies some amount of the previous literature one must survey 
to check for coherence, and which methodological procedures one must carry out to reach a 
conclusion that is worth reporting to others. One’s avowal must be such that if one’s total 
evidence were what one had gathered in the methodologically proper way for one’s latest study, 
combined with whatever one has taken from the mandated subset of the previous literature 
contains, then one would be justified in believing one’s scientific public avowal. Public avowals 
are or should be held to specific subfield-specific norms thus generated—these norms for 
specifying the requisite literature to survey and adopting methods whose results are worth 
reporting on are implicitly taught to young scientists as part of their graduate and postdoctoral 
training. 
 
Such a norm captures the sense in which researchers are held to demanding standards 
while remaining consistent with the various arguments we have offered showing that apt 
scientific public avowals need be neither true, known, believed, justified, reasonable to be 
believed, nor believed to be any such. We note that in the case of philosophy people have also 
argued that it is permissible to put forward claims even which one does not believe and are not 
justified (Goldberg 2013, Barnett 2019, Plakias 2019). Hence if something like this norm is 
found to be operative in scientific fields it may well be a source of similarity between scientific 
and humanistic research. Coming to self-conscious understanding of such a norm may thus 
contribute in some small way to bridging the infamous two cultures divide. 
 
The project for future inquiry would be to try and specify the details of what is implicitly 
being taught as normatively correct for putting forward avowals, and submit it to epistemic 
appraisal. To some extent, while not done explicitly under this aegis, the response to the 
replication crisis has led to just this discussion. Renewed consideration of standards of 
statistical significance and the ways in which journals decide what ought to be published have 
taken centre stage in scientists' discussions of their own practice. Rendering this more 
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systematic and linking it more explicitly to epistemic theory would not only be interesting itself, 
but would also speak to the questions of science communication raised earlier. If we are to rely 
on scientific papers to guide policy and public discussion, it would be useful for us all to be clear 
on exactly what the epistemic status of the main claims of published scientific papers are. It 
would be inappropriate for us to rely on inter-scientific testimony as if they were put forward as 
proper assertions. Rather, we should read them as statements being put forward under very 





When stating their central claims scientists should not be held to the kind of norms we hold 
assertions to if collective inquiry is to flourish. At the least, properly put forward scientific public 
avowals frequently do not and need not satisfy those norms of assertion that have been 
discussed in the analytic epistemology literature. Public avowals in science ought to be 
governed by a different norm. 
 
We have suggested a contextualist justificatory norm as our proposal. But of course 
there are other possibilities, and this should be considered an area open for future inquiry. We 
note one especially interesting idea, drawing on the work of Yablo (2014). A long tradition sees 
science as in the business of putting forward partial truths, and our case study could be read 
that way. One could thus develop an account of the appropriate standards for scientific public 
avowals based upon a partial factive norm. It would take us very far afield to develop the 
technical machinery necessary to properly study this, and in any case, we prefer our 
contextualist justificatory account. However, we raise the possibility here partly to acknowledge 
it, and partly to make it apparent how much room there is for fruitful development in the 
theoretical study of what sort of norms should govern particular acts of putting forward 
conclusions in light of the wider project of collective inquiry. 
 
Underlying all our arguments is the conviction that a scientific research community must 
ensure its members must spread out across logical space. We must allow for the exploration of 
different theories, by different methods, and accept that there will be different positions adopted 
as time goes by and results accumulate. Perhaps inquiry shall prove to be a process of never 
ending adjustment, and this will be our state in perpetuity. Or perhaps we may eventually learn 
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from science what is actual. But even if so, in order to get there, we must allow that in the midst 
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